OpenAI and Anthropic’s public benefit corporations offer several avenues to align their activities with their stated mission. Directors should consider the mission among other factors, while reporting requirements and certifications incentivize mission compliance. Yet in practice, enforcing the mission remains elusive.
1. Limited Director Liability for Prioritizing Profit Over Mission
Whereas traditional for-profit corporations exclusively serve stockholders’ interests, public benefit corporations require directors to balance the financial interests of shareholders with the benefits of those materially affected and the specific public interest mission of the company.314Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 365(a). Directors pursue a triple bottom line: profit, people, planet.315(<)em(>)Benefit Corporations: Upholding the Triple Bottom Line(<)/em(>), (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 311. But, crucially, they have significant leeway in how they balance these factors. Under the business judgment rule, courts will not second-guess how directors balance the three relevant factors, deferring to them as long as their decisions are informed and disinterested.316Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 365(b); The Delaware Way, (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 102; Briana Cummings, (<)em(>)Benefit Corporations: How to Enforce a Mandate to Promote the Public Interest(<)/em(>), 112 Colum. L. Rev. 578 (2012) (noting the limited role of shareholder suits given business judgment rule). Directors simply have to clear the low bar of avoiding decisions that “no person of ordinary, sound judgment would approve.”317Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 365(b); (<)em(>)see also(<)/em(>) Michael B. Dorff, James Hicks & Steven D. Solomon, (<)em(>)The Future or Fancy? An Empirical Study of Public Benefit Corporations(<)/em(>), 11 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 113 (2021). Given this significant leeway, PBC directors can still prioritize profits at the expense of the mission,318Paul Oudin & Teodora Groza, (<)em(>)The Governance of AI Companies: Reconciling Purpose with Profits(<)/em(>) (Sep. 20, 2024) (unpublished manuscript), (<)a href='https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=4972751'(>)https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=4972751(<)/a(>). with the notable exception of OpenAI, which must exclusively consider the mission for safety and security issues, something section 3 below unpacks further.319Tyler Whitmer, (<)em(>)OpenAI’s Restructuring Makes Safety-Focused Shareholder Litigation Possible(<)/em(>), LASST (Nov. 19, 2025), (<)a href='https://lasst.org/2025/11/19/the-litigation-risk-openai-just-created/'(>)https://lasst.org/2025/11/19/the-litigation-risk-openai-just-created/(<)/a(>) (predicting this will facilitate shareholder actions against the Board for failing to prioritize the mission in safety and security decisions); (<)em(>)see(<)/em(>) (<)em(>)also(<)/em(>) (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 100 and accompanying text for a discussion of the mission-only carve-out.
PBC directors who fail to balance the three factors face minimal consequences. Both companies protect directors from personal liability as much as the law permits,320(<)em(>)See(<)/em(>) (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 273 and accompanying text. insulating them from punishable bad faith or breach of the duty of loyalty.321Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 365(c); (<)em(>)Anthropic Certificates of Incorporation(<)/em(>), (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 3, Art. IX (A) (Mar. 27, 2025 version); Anne-Marie Beliveau et al., (<)em(>)Delaware Public Benefit Corporations—Recent Developments(<)/em(>), Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. Governance (Aug. 31, 2020), (<)a href='https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/08/31/delaware-public-benefit-corporations-recent-developments/'(>)https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/08/31/delaware-public-benefit-corporations-recent-developments/(<)/a(>) (noting the change from an opt-in liability limitation to an opt-out regime). Further weakening the grip of fiduciary duties is the requirement that shareholders own at least 2% of equity to force the directors of a Delaware PBC to pursue the mission.322Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 367. Should the PBCs go public,323George Hammond, (<)em(>)Anthropic Files for Blockbuster Initial Public Offering(<)/em(>), Fin. Times (June 1, 2026), (<)a href='https://www.ft.com/content/4f82f41c-24e7-4323-899a-17a04badd29e?syn-25a6b1a6=1'(>)https://www.ft.com/content/4f82f41c-24e7-4323-899a-17a04badd29e?syn-25a6b1a6=1(<)/a(>). that threshold would be lowered to owning $2 million in shares, exposing AI PBCs to more litigation. For the time being, current investors are primarily venture capitalists and large technology companies with few incentives to enforce the mission over profits. Finally, the statute makes clear that directors don’t owe a duty to materially affected people or the public writ large.324Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 365(b). Shareholders, not stakeholders, can hold directors accountable. As a result of all these limitations, few people can demand that directors enforce the mission. As a result, directors get a blank check allowing them to prioritize profit or the mission as they see fit, without fear of legal liability. By some accounts, AI companies have actually flipped the PBC idea on its head: designed to free directors to choose mission over profit, it actually shields directors that prioritize profit over mission.325Andrew Muchin Goldblatt, (<)em(>)The Inverted Benefit Corporation: OpenAI and the Limits of Mission Governance(<)/em(>) (May 11, 2026) (unpublished manuscript), (<)a href='https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=6613658'(>)https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=6613658(<)/a(>) (observing that OpenAI’s recapitalization into a PBC introduced profit considerations into a non-profit structure).
2. Public Reporting
Public benefit corporations have to report how they promote their stated public benefit mission as well as the interests of those materially affected. That said, the reports are geared towards stockholders, with no statutory obligations to make them public.326Del. Code Ann. tit. 8(<)em(>),(<)/em(>) § 366. As part of its deal with the AGs, OpenAI will provide semi-annual reports, but Anthropic’s remain confidential.327CA MOU, (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 99 ¶ 17; DE MOU, (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 99 ¶ 15. Either way, reporting offers limited post facto accountability, at best incentivizing mission alignment through indirect pressure.
3. Attorneys General Oversight
In a public letter citing their ability to block the restructuring, state AGs noted concerns about the role of AI chatbots in the death of children, urging the company to “proactively and transparently ensure AI’s safe deployment. Doing so is mandated by OpenAI’s charitable mission, and will be required and enforced by our respective offices.”328Letter from Kwame Raoul, Att’y Gen. of Ill. et al., to Bret Taylor, Chair, Board of Directors, OpenAI (Sep. 5, 2025), (<)a href='https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/attachments/press-docs/2025-09-05%20-%20Letter%20from%20DE%20AG%20and%20CA%20AG%20-%20FINAL%20with%20NAAG%20Letter.pdf'(>)https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/attachments/press-docs/2025-09-05%20-%20Letter%20from%20DE%20AG%20and%20CA%20AG%20-%20FINAL%20with%20NAAG%20Letter.pdf(<)/a(>). Leveraging their power to challenge OpenAI’s PBC conversion from a non-profit to a for-profit model, the attorneys general of Delaware and California secured governance and safety commitments in memoranda of understanding of “non-objection” in which they undertake not to take enforcement actions against the company in return for its agreement to a series of conditions.329(<)em(>)See supra(<)/em(>) notes 289–290 and accompanying text for broad AG powers.
The agreement requires the OpenAI Foundation to act consistently with the mission, including in their appointment and removal of the PBC Board, which must remain majority independent.330CA MOU, (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 99 ¶¶ 2, 5, 15; DE MOU, (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 99 ¶¶ 1, 4, 13. Should the company stray from said obligations, the AGs could intervene.331Jesse Fried & Idan Reiter, (<)em(>)AI Corporate Governance and Ben & Jerry’s Risk(<)/em(>) 51 n.221 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 927/2026, 2026), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=6697999. The agreement also grants the Safety and Security Committee (a subset of the Non Profit Foundation) a right of approval over safety decisions. This right sits in a contract between the Non Profit Foundation and OpenAI PBC, with the contract itself a condition of the AGs’ non-objection.332(<)em(>)See(<)/em(>) (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 99 and accompanying text. The AGs thus have the option to intervene should the PBC fail to honor the Committee’s right of approval, although some have pointed out the vague scope of this right.333Goldblatt, (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 325, at 23, 46. The non-exhaustive description of the Committee’s enforcement power focuses on the release of models or systems, so it’s unclear whether it would reach in-house or evaluation environments such as those in which the summer and fall 2026 containment failures occurred.334OpenAI, Hugging Face Incident: Technical Report (Aug. 26, 2026), https://cdn.openai.com/pdf/67869394-cb91-4c12-888c-5cbd85c7814c/OpenAI-Hugging-Face%20Incident-Technical-Report.pdf; METR & Redwood Research, (<)em(>)Brief Independent Investigation of Agents’ Behavior, Reasoning and Collaboration in the OpenAI/Hugging Face Hacking Incident(<)/em(>) (Aug. 26, 2026), https://metr.org/blog/2026-08-26-openai-hugging-face-incident-investigation/; (<)em(>)An Agent Used DNS to Reach an External Chatbot(<)/em(>), OpenAI (Sep. 25, 2026), https://alignment.openai.com/misalignment-reports/an-agent-used-dns-to-reach-an-external-chatbot/ (documenting an OpenAI agent’s September 20, 2026 escape from a sandboxed evaluation environment). Future research should clarify gaps in the Safety and Security Committee’s mandate in light of such incidents.