Long dormant, the state’s ability to revoke a corporation’s ability to operate has recently resurfaced as an option to rein in AI companies. Historically, corporations relied on direct state approval to exist. Governments individually approved the founding documents of corporations, known as charters, allowing them to operate for specific public purposes. In the U.S., corporations enjoyed limited liability in order to undertake major public projects such as the construction of railroads.335For a fuller history of corporations, see Tyler Halloran, (<)em(>)A Brief History of the Corporate Form and Why It Matters(<)/em(>), Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. Blog (Nov. 18, 2018), (<)a href='https://news.law.fordham.edu/jcfl/2018/11/18/a-brief-history-of-the-corporate-form-and-why-it-matters/'(>)https://news.law.fordham.edu/jcfl/2018/11/18/a-brief-history-of-the-corporate-form-and-why-it-matters/(<)/a(>) [(<)a href='https://web.archive.org/web/20210110171139/https://news.law.fordham.edu/jcfl/2018/11/18/a-brief-history-of-the-corporate-form-and-why-it-matters/'(>)https://web.archive.org/web/20210110171139/https://news.law.fordham.edu/jcfl/2018/11/18/a-brief-history-of-the-corporate-form-and-why-it-matters/(<)/a(>)]. Corporations carried out public service or infrastructure building with private investment, and the government maintained indirect control through the ability to revoke their charter should they digress from the public goals justifying their existence.336Daniel Hanley, (<)em(>)Pass Corporate Chartering Power to Washington(<)/em(>), Democracy J. (Sep. 8, 2021), (<)a href='https://democracyjournal.org/arguments/pass-corporate-chartering-power-to-washington/'(>)https://democracyjournal.org/arguments/pass-corporate-chartering-power-to-washington/(<)/a(>). The state’s power to revoke a corporation’s license to operate ensured public control over its activities.337Thomas Linzey, (<)em(>)Killing Goliath: Defending Our Sovereignty and Environmental Sustainability through Corporate Charter Revocation in Pennsylvania and Delaware(<)/em(>), 6 Dick. J. Env’t. L. & Pol’y 31, 36 (1997). In Delaware, where all three companies are incorporated, the Constitution still guarantees the state’s ability to revoke the charter of corporations that abuse or misuse their powers,338(<)em(>)Delaware Constitution(<)/em(>), (<)a href='https://delcode.delaware.gov/constitution/constitution-10.html'(>)https://delcode.delaware.gov/constitution/constitution-10.html(<)/a(>) (last visited Nov. 21, 2025) (“The General Assembly shall, by general law, provide for the revocation or forfeiture of the charters of all corporations for the abuse, misuse, or non-user of their corporate powers, privileges or franchises. Any proceeding for such revocation or forfeiture, shall be taken by the Attorney-General, as may be provided by law”). and the relevant statute gives courts jurisdiction to do so for “abuse, misuse or nonuse of its corporate powers, privileges or franchises.”339Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 284(a). 

Seldom used today, charter revocation is considered the “nuclear option” reserved for grave misconduct, criminal wrongdoing and statutory violations.340 Steven A. Ramirez & Mary Kreiner Ramirez, The Case for the Corporate Death Penalty: Restoring Law and Order on Wall Street (2017), (<)a href='https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/193/monograph/book/57436'(>)https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/193/monograph/book/57436(<)/a(>); Kyle Noonan, (<)em(>)The Case for a Federal Corporate Charter Revocation Penalty(<)/em(>), 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 602 (2012), (<)a href='https://www.gwlr.org/the-case-for-a-federal-corporate-charter-revocation-penalty/'(>)https://www.gwlr.org/the-case-for-a-federal-corporate-charter-revocation-penalty/(<)/a(>); Drew I. Grossman, Note, (<)em(>)Would a Corporate Death Penalty Be Cruel and Unusual Punishment(<)/em(>), 25 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 697 (2016), https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cjlpp/vol25/iss3/4/. Courts put a high bar on revocation, noting in one case that “[c]ontinued serious criminal violations by corporate agents in the course of the discharge of their duties could very well constitute the misuse of a charter,” and in another that they look for “sustained course of fraud, immorality or violations of statutory law before deciding that there has been an abuse of charter privileges.”341(<)em(>)Craven v. Fifth Ward Republican Club(<)/em(>), 146 A.2d 400 (Del. Ch. 1958); (<)em(>)Young v. Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of White People(<)/em(>), 109 A.2d 29, 31 (Del. Ch. 1954); (<)em(>)see also(<)/em(>) Edward P. Welch et al., Folk on the Delaware General Corporation Law: A Commentary and Analysis § 284.01, at 10-163 (7th ed. 2021). That said, some argue that the increased risk of bioweapons is so immoral as to justify revoking the charter of AI companies.342Kevin Frazier, (<)em(>)AI, Bioweapons, and Corporate Charters: The Case for Delaware Revoking OpenAI’s Charter(<)/em(>), Harv. J. L. & Tech. Dig. Comment. (May 22, 2024), (<)a href='https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/ai-bioweapons-and-corporate-charters-the-case-for-delaware-revoking-openais-charter'(>)https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/ai-bioweapons-and-corporate-charters-the-case-for-delaware-revoking-openais-charter(<)/a(>) (last visited Feb. 25, 2025). This theory remains untested, but opens the door to revoking the charter of any Delaware-incorporated AI company whose actions deviate from the purpose embedded in their corporate form. 

OpenAI’s charter could also be open to revocation under the theory that its for-profit operations exceed the bounds of the original non-profit corporation. In a case where the organizer operated a non-profit social club for his personal financial benefit, the court observed that “[i]t was not the intention of the Legislature to allow the easy and liberal provisions of the corporation and revenue statutes applicable to corporations organized not for profit to be enjoyed by corporations whose purpose is in fact to engage in business for profit.”343(<)em(>)Southerland ex rel. Snider v. Decimo Club, Inc.(<)/em(>), 142 A. 786 (Del. Ch. 1928). This theory likely held more purchase during the hybrid capped-profit interregnum than now with the stabilized, well-funded foundation given that the attorneys general have now essentially acquiesced to the new structure.344(<)em(>)See supra(<)/em(>) note 98 and accompanying text. But even if remote, the prospect of a charter revocation may have played a backstop role against a full commercial pivot, as an additional layer of deterrence.

Charter revocation is likely more rhetorical than realistic, especially because a corporation can simply reincorporate in another state.345Hanley, (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 336. Delaware courts are very unlikely to revoke the charter of a flagship US company as this would erode the state’s reputation as a business-friendly jurisdiction—especially at a time when other states are vying to take its place. That said, successful litigation is not the only metric for leverage, as the mere prospect of litigation and even negative public discourse can influence the calculus of how far companies stray from their mission. 

Corporate and securities law alone are not a magic bullet, but they can narrow the distance between mission and action. The obligations attaching to non-profit entities have done the most work thus far, effectively preventing OpenAI from completely abandoning its mission. As such, a PBC can foster, but not force, a company to align mission and action. Investor protection for publicly listed companies, including conventional for-profit corporations like Alphabet, offers a pathway to hold companies accountable for inconsistencies between their statements and their actions, but employees blowing the whistle stand to lose a significant part of their compensation. As for shareholder resolutions, the dual-class structure of companies like Google cabins them to symbolic gestures. Finally, attorneys general nominally retain the ability to revoke the charter of companies acting inconsistently with their mission or the public interest, but this narrow recourse of last resort is seldom activated.