After multiple twists and turns in its corporate structure, the newly-minted OpenAI public benefit corporation remains controlled by a charity, the OpenAI Foundation. Throughout the evolution of the company, the obligation to pursue the charitable purpose embedded in the company’s DNA has been a backstop, preventing it from abandoning its mission altogether.
1. OpenAI’s Non-Profit Purpose and Ensuing Legal Obligations
OpenAI’s founding documents declare that “[t]he specific purpose of this corporation is to provide funding for research, development and distribution of technology related to artificial intelligence. The resulting technology will benefit the public and the corporation will seek to open source technology for the public when applicable. The corporation is not organized for the private gain of any person.”284OpenAI, (<)em(>)Certificate of Incorporation and Bylaws(<)/em(>), (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 40. The CEO reiterated the crucial role of the non-profit constraint to preserve the company’s public interest mission: “At OpenAI, when we wrote our charter, we talked about the scenarios where we would or wouldn’t make money. And . . . the things we wouldn’t be willing to do no matter how much money they made. And we made this public so the public would hold us accountable to that. And I think that’s really important.”285Eric Johnson, (<)em(>)Full Q&A: Y Combinator’s Sam Altman and Recode’s Kara Swisher Discuss Tech Ethics, Addiction and Facebook(<)/em(>), Vox (Dec. 10, 2018), (<)a href='https://www.vox.com/2018/12/10/18134926/sam-altman-kara-swisher-recode-decode-live-mannys-podcast-transcript-facebook-zuckerberg-ethics'(>)https://www.vox.com/2018/12/10/18134926/sam-altman-kara-swisher-recode-decode-live-mannys-podcast-transcript-facebook-zuckerberg-ethics(<)/a(>).
The law of non-profit organizations provides mechanisms to operationalize these commitments. The board of directors and the officers of a charitable organization owe special duties to the non-profit and its donors. Among these obligations is the fiduciary duty of loyalty to put the interest of the non-profit above one’s own. A widely cited opinion conveys the high standard of the duty of loyalty as follows:
“Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm’s length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate.”286(<)em(>)Meinhard v. Salmon(<)/em(>), 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
Loyalty requires board members to prioritize the non-profit mission, in good faith and in a manner they reasonably believe to be in the best interests of the charity in light of its purposes.287A.L.I., Restatement of the Law – Charitable Nonprofit Organizations (2007) § 2.02 “Duty of Loyalty”; Aprill, Loui & Horwitz, (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 71, at 293; Loui, (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 87. Therefore, the non-profit purpose is the North Star for any decision the board of the Foundation makes. In the new PBC structure, the non-profit board is one degree remote from overseeing the operations of the company, as its role is essentially to elect the board of the PBC (see Figure 7 above). In that sense, the breadth of the duty of loyalty is quite limited. However, the Foundation’s board retains oversight of the Safety and Security Committee, and in that capacity could make consequential decisions to halt the release of models or AI systems. Those decisions should comport with the non-profit mission to the exclusion of financial considerations. In the event that they don’t, this could be construed as a breach of the duty of loyalty. In California where OpenAI carries most of its activities, the law also creates a fiduciary relationship between a donor and the charity or person soliciting on behalf of that charity.288Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17510.8. Accepting charitable contributions creates a duty to use the contributions for the charitable purposes for which they were sought. These various obligations binding the Board of the Foundation require it to advance, not stifle, the non-profit mission.
2. Who Can Enforce OpenAI’s Non-Profit Mission
State attorneys general play a key role in ensuring that OpenAI remains loyal to its charitable mission. They have broad powers to monitor non-profits converting to for-profit status, including authority to initiate legal proceedings to oppose structural changes that would jeopardize the non-profit’s assets and mission.289Cal. Gov’t Code § 12598(a) (2023); Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 284 (2025) (authorizing AG to seek charter revocation post facto); Restatement of the Law, Charitable Nonprofit Organizations § 5.01 (Am. Law Inst. 2021). Delaware also specifically bars converting a nonstock corporation “if the charitable status of such charitable nonstock corporation would thereby be lost or impaired.”290Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 266(j) (2025).
The board members of the charity (formerly OpenAI Inc., now OpenAI Foundation) could also bring a claim on its behalf.291A.L.I., (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 287, § 6 “Standing of a Private Party to Bring an Action on Behalf of a Charity: The Derivative Action”; Aprill, Loui & Horwitz, (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 71, at 295 (noting that technically the members of the corporation, not the board members, have standing in Delaware, but that in practice the board members are also the corporation members); (<)em(>)see also(<)/em(>) Certificate of Incorporation and Bylaws, (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 40, art. II 1(1) establishing that the board members serve as members of the corporation. But since the charity stands to gain from increased profitability, board members have little incentive to enforce the mission through a derivative action. As for ousted members, Delaware denies them standing to sue on behalf of the charity, even when confronted with the objection that this creates a perverse incentive to oust internal critics as a way to preclude derivative actions.292(<)em(>)Gassis v. Corkery(<)/em(>), C.A. No. 8868-VCG, 2014 WL 3565418, at *4–6 (Del. Ch. July 21, 2014) (letter op.), (<)em(>)aff’d(<)/em(>), 116 A.3d 1080 (Del. 2015); (<)em(>)see also(<)/em(>) (<)em(>)Schoon v. Smith(<)/em(>), 953 A.2d 196, 205–08 (Del. 2008) (reserving equitable derivative standing for cases presenting a “complete failure of justice” and declining to extend it to directors). The Restatement of the Law, Charitable Nonprofit Organizations, an authoritative synthesis of charity law which guides but does not bind courts, takes the opposite view: board members removed for trying to address the very harm they seek to challenge should keep their standing.293A.L.I., (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 287, § 6.02(b)(2)(B). OpenAI’s fired directors are a case in point: removed amid a dispute over whether the company was straying from its mission, they lost standing to sue on behalf of the charity.
Donors also have various recourses against the charity. They can invoke a breach of the above-mentioned fiduciary duty to use the collected funds for the intended charitable purpose. Elon Musk’s lawsuit against OpenAI detailed below significant hurdles, but they rest on procedural technicalities rather than the substance of the claims.294(<)em(>)Musk v. Altman,(<)/em(>) No. 4:24-cv-04722 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2024) (finding by jury that the claims were barred as Musk waited too long to file). More controversially, donors could try to sue on behalf of the company to enforce the fiduciary duties of the board. In jurisdictions like Delaware, only the attorney general has the ability to do so, but the law is in flux.295A.L.I., (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 287, § 6.03 Standing of a Private Party to Enforce the Purposes to Which Charitable Assets are Devoted and Administrative Terms Governing Charitable Assets—general comments; (<)em(>)Oberly v. Kirby(<)/em(>), 592 A.2d 445, 464 (Del. 1990) (“Delaware law unambiguously places the burden of protecting the interests of beneficiaries upon the Attorney General.”); (<)em(>)Wier v. Howard Hughes Medical Institute(<)/em(>), 404 A.2d 140, 145 (Del. Ch. 1979) (“It is generally recognized that the appropriate person to enforce the provisions of a Delaware charitable trust is the State Attorney General.”); Samuel D. Brunson, (<)em(>)Musk, OpenAI and the Internal Affairs Doctrine(<)/em(>), Nonprofit L. Prof Blog (Sep. 10, 2025), (<)a href='https://web.archive.org/web/20250910172001/https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/nonprofit/2024/03/musk-openai-and-the-internal-affairs-doctrine.html'(>)https://web.archive.org/web/20250910172001/https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/nonprofit/2024/03/musk-openai-and-the-internal-affairs-doctrine.html(<)/a(>) (noting that California may be more flexible).
Irrespective of the formal standing to sue on behalf of the charity, many actors have sought to prevent changes to the structure of OpenAI that would jeopardize commitments to its mission. They have done so by way of formal court proceedings, but also by using these obligations to channel their demands that OpenAI remain consistent with its mission. The next section outlines how various actors have invoked the spirit and the letter of non-profit law to align the company’s action with its mission.
3. Enforcing the Mission in Practice
OpenAI’s non-profit mission has allowed a variety of actors to contest every step of the company’s commercial pivot. The examples below show that the charitable purpose feeds both formal lawsuits and broader challenges to corporate restructuring away from the original non-profit form.
Investor Lawsuit Contesting the Capped-Profit Joint Venture
When OpenAI pivoted to a capped-profit structure, investor Elon Musk pushed back.296(<)em(>)See(<)/em(>) (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) p. 5 (summarizing the change from an initial single non-profit entity towards a joint venture between the original non-profit and newly created for-profit companies). Based on donations in the range of $45-50 million,297Harris, (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 49; (<)em(>)OpenAI and Elon Musk(<)/em(>), (<)a href='https://openai.com/index/openai-elon-musk/'(>)https://openai.com/index/openai-elon-musk/(<)/a(>) (last visited Sep. 24, 2025). Musk challenged the company’s capped-profit model both in the court of public opinion and in actual court. He criticized OpenAI’s business model for funding initial R&D with donations, only to slide the resulting IP into for-profit ventures. When the company secured an exclusive licensing deal with Microsoft in return for its $10 billion investment in 2023,298(<)em(>)Musk v. OpenAI,(<)/em(>) No. CGC-24-6127476 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Feb. 29, 2024). Musk alleged that OpenAI, Microsoft and other defendants “have chosen to use GPT-4 not for the benefit of humanity, but as proprietary technology to maximize profits for literally the largest company in the world”.299(<)em(>)Id.(<)/em(>) ¶ 90. Musk narrowed his claims to unjust enrichment and breach of charitable trust shortly before trial. The latter claim rests on the idea that OpenAI owes donors a fiduciary duty to use donations for the intended charitable purposes. The complaint frames the exclusive licensing deal with Microsoft and failure to release details of the GPT-4 model as running afoul of the mission to open source technology for the public benefit.300 (<)em(>)Id.(<)/em(>) ¶ 134. OpenAI’s fiduciary duty towards its donors thus played a key role in articulating concerns about mission drift in the capped-profit restructuring.
At the time of finalizing this report, a trial judge dismissed the lawsuit on a technicality, as a jury found that Musk had exceeded the three-year window before filing his complaint.301Cade Metz & Mike Isaac, (<)em(>)Elon Musk Loses $150 Billion Suit Against OpenAI and Sam Altman(<)/em(>), N. Y. Times (May 18, 2026), (<)a href='https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/18/technology/elon-musk-lawsuit-openai-sam-altman.html'(>)https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/18/technology/elon-musk-lawsuit-openai-sam-altman.html(<)/a(>). Musk has vowed to appeal and the case is currently assigned a mediator.302Peter Blumberg, (<)em(>)Musk-Altman Judge Enlists Mediator to Resolve AI Titans’ Battle(<)/em(>), Bloomberg (July 2, 2026), (<)a href='https://news.bloomberglaw.com/litigation/musk-altman-judge-enlists-mediator-to-resolve-ai-titans-battle'(>)https://news.bloomberglaw.com/litigation/musk-altman-judge-enlists-mediator-to-resolve-ai-titans-battle(<)/a(>). Irrespective of the lawsuit’s outcome, it has put a significant hurdle in the way of OpenAI. The very fact that the company had to expend time and resources on a claim credible enough to make its way to trial, at a critical juncture with an impending IPO and as the company was elbowing with Anthropic catching up to its market position, suggests that legal protections for non-profit organizations put real pressure on business decisions to depart from the stated mission.
Broad Pushback Against For-Profit Restructuring
As soon as it was rumored to convert to a for-profit model, OpenAI faced a barrage of criticism.303(<)em(>)See(<)/em(>) (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) notes 86–88 and accompanying text on the proposed for-profit structure. Donors, competitors and civil society coalitions all raised the immutable non-profit mission as a roadblock standing in the way of this change, invoking various aspects of the legal framework pertaining to non-profit organizations. Echoing Musk’s contention that diverting donation towards for-profit activities breached the fiduciary duty to use the funds for the stated charitable purposes of open sourcing AI technology for the benefit of humanity,304Complaint ¶¶ 316–28, (<)em(>)Musk v. Altman(<)/em(>), No. 4:24-cv-04722 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2024). competitor Meta also took issue with OpenAI’s about-face. Its complaint to the California Attorney General reads as follows:
“[I]f OpenAI’s new business model is valid, non-profit investors would get the same for-profit upside as those who invest the conventional way in for-profit companies while also benefiting from tax write-offs bestowed by the government and, ultimately, the public. That would distort the market by essentially requiring any startup seeking to remain competitive to adopt the same playbook.”305Letter from Meta Platforms, Inc., to Rob Bonta, Att’y Gen. of Cal. (Dec. 2024) (on file with author).
Though it did not cite specific provisions or case law pertaining to the protection of the non-profit purpose, Meta’s position is rooted in the principle that a non-profit organization must remain true to its charitable purpose.
Civil society actors also leveraged non-profit rules to oppose OpenAI’s for-profit restructuring. An open letter by the Not For Private Gain coalition composed of former OpenAI employees, technology workers, academics and civil society groups warned that removing non-profit control would contravene the legally protected charitable purpose and contravene the fiduciary duties owed to the beneficiaries of the non-profit.306Not For Private Gain, (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 88 April 2025 letter. Non-profit law concepts thus provided the coalition with the vocabulary and tools to prevent OpenAI from abandoning its non-profit structure and mission altogether.
Legislative intervention also sought to protect the original non-profit purpose of OpenAI. A coalition of researchers, consumer advocates, non-profits, and community leaders called for legal reforms preventing the for-profit conversion of non-profits like OpenAI. The California bill AB 501 would have prohibited non-profits worth over $1 million from converting into for-profit companies.307(<)em(>)AB 501- AMENDED(<)/em(>), (<)a href='https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202520260AB501'(>)https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202520260AB501(<)/a(>) (last visited Sep. 4, 2025); Peter Windberger, (<)em(>)New Bill AB 501 to Prevent OpenAI’s Non-Profit Conversion(<)/em(>), LessWrong (2025), (<)a href='https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/n3fWYBydMi3yGNyLh/new-bill-ab-501-to-prevent-openai-s-non-profit-conversion'(>)https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/n3fWYBydMi3yGNyLh/new-bill-ab-501-to-prevent-openai-s-non-profit-conversion(<)/a(>). Though the effort did not come to fruition,308Gary Marcus, (<)em(>)BREAKING: Bill That Would Have Blocked OpenAI’s Conversion to a for-Profit Has Mysteriously Been Gutted.(<)/em(>), Marcus on AI (Apr. 6, 2025), (<)a href='https://garymarcus.substack.com/p/breaking-bill-that-would-have-blocked'(>)https://garymarcus.substack.com/p/breaking-bill-that-would-have-blocked(<)/a(>). it shows that the integrity of a non-profit is a potent argument to ensure AI companies structured as such remain true to their mission.
Overall, mobilizing non-profit law to oppose OpenAI’s for-profit conversion appears to have had some bearing on the company’s decision not to move forward with a full for-profit restructuring. It stated that “[w]e made the decision for the nonprofit to retain control of OpenAI after hearing from civic leaders and engaging in constructive dialogue with the offices of the Attorney General of Delaware and the Attorney General of California,”309(<)em(>)Evolving OpenAI’s Structure(<)/em(>), OpenAI, (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 44. thus indicating that non-profit safeguards constrained its ability to shed the charitable form and mission.
Civil Society and Attorneys General Influence on the PBC Recapitalization Plan
As of November 2025, OpenAI has completed its transition to yet another bespoke model. The non-profit entity retains control over a newly created public benefit corporation, nominating its directors and retaining a right of approval over safety and security matters.310(<)em(>)See(<)/em(>) (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 99 and accompanying text for a discussion of the new structure, the powers of the Foundation’s board and the right of approval of its Safety and Security Committee. In the lead-up to this change, civil society groups have invoked the non-profit purpose to voice concerns over the restructuring as endangering the company’s mission. In a letter to the attorneys general of California and Delaware, the Not for Private Gain coalition flagged that the new structure removed the primacy of the charitable purpose, undermining the leadership’s fiduciary duty to act in pursuit of the company’s mission.311Not For Private Gain, (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 88 May 12, 2025 letter. (<)em(>)See(<)/em(>) CA MOU, (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 99; Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 365(a); (<)em(>)Benefit Corporations: Upholding the Triple Bottom Line(<)/em(>), USC Gould School of Law, (<)a href='https://gould.usc.edu/news/benefit-corporations-upholding-the-triple-bottom-line/'(>)https://gould.usc.edu/news/benefit-corporations-upholding-the-triple-bottom-line/(<)/a(>) (last visited Nov. 14, 2025) (explaining that Delaware public benefit corporations give directors leeway to balance several factors). A coalition of over 60 organizations has filed a formal petition demanding that the California Attorney General investigate OpenAI’s compliance with its charitable mission.312Letter from Fred Blackwell, CEO, San Francisco Foundation et al., to Rob Bonta, Att’y Gen. of Cal. (June 26, 2025), (<)a href='https://docs.google.com/document/d/122d3w4nW9HWLEx4EMOnHEinbezNBsw0t9zdviIK8I-w/edit'(>)https://docs.google.com/document/d/122d3w4nW9HWLEx4EMOnHEinbezNBsw0t9zdviIK8I-w/edit(<)/a(>)? (last visited Sep. 23, 2025). The coalition noted that the restructuring would jeopardize the company’s legal duty to prioritize its public interest mission, adding that the non-profit should receive adequate compensation for its assets. Both groups channeled non-profit law to align OpenAI with its mission. At their core, they make two claims: the company should remain committed to its charitable mission, and it should use its assets to serve the public good. The attorneys general of Delaware and California secured safety and governance commitments as a condition not to oppose the restructuring, something the section on AG oversight returns to.313(<)em(>)Supra(<)/em(>) note 99(<)em(>).(<)/em(>)
Overall, legal safeguards pertaining to non-profit organizations have enabled different stakeholders to contest OpenAI’s for-profit conversion, and have secured some protections of the mission in the new PBC structure. However, there are persisting concerns that these measures are insufficient to align the company’s behavior with the spirit of its publicly minded mission. As the next section shows, enforcing the mission of a public benefit corporation is a fraught endeavor.