OpenAI is the company behind some of the most prominent AI products such as ChatGPT and former video generating application Sora. Initially set up as a single non-profit, it then nested a fleet of for-profit entities under an overarching non-profit corporation, only to morph once again into a single public benefit corporation nominally overseen by a non-profit foundation. The company started off with an explicit mission to benefit the public, “not organized for the private gain of any person.”40OpenAI, (<)em(>)Certificate of Incorporation and Bylaws(<)/em(>) 1 (2015), (<)a href='https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/25197523-openai-application-for-tax-exempt-status/'(>)https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/25197523-openai-application-for-tax-exempt-status/(<)/a(>). Its tax-exemption application frames it as a “nonprofit artificial intelligence (“AI”) scientific research organization” aiming to “engage in research activities that advance digital intelligence in the way that is most likely to benefit humanity as a whole, unconstrained by a need to generate financial return.”41OpenAI, (<)em(>)Internal Revenue Service Form 1023, supra(<)/em(>) note 4, at 30. Its non-binding 2018 Charter further commits to a “fiduciary duty to humanity,” noting concerns about a competitive race to the bottom and power concentration issues in the field.42OpenAI Charter, (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 2 (defining AGI as “highly autonomous systems that outperform humans at most economically valuable work—benefits all of humanity”). For a critique of AGI as an “aspirational technological construct” and a fuller genealogy of the company, see Brian Merchant, AI Generated Business: The Rise of AGI and the Rush to Find a Working Revenue Model 3 (2024), (<)a href='https://ainowinstitute.org/publications/ai-generated-business'(>)https://ainowinstitute.org/publications/ai-generated-business(<)/a(>). However, the company’s corporate structure has significantly evolved over time, calling into question its ability to embody these ideals. Citing the need to raise more capital as its technology gained traction from proof-of-concept to overnight success with ChatGPT,43Krystal Hu, (<)em(>)ChatGPT Sets Record for Fastest-Growing User Base(<)/em(>), Reuters (Feb. 2, 2023), (<)a href='https://www.reuters.com/technology/chatgpt-sets-record-fastest-growing-user-base-analyst-note-2023-02-01/'(>)https://www.reuters.com/technology/chatgpt-sets-record-fastest-growing-user-base-analyst-note-2023-02-01/(<)/a(>) (last visited July 7, 2025) (reporting that ChatGPT had reached 100 million users in just two months). Threads has since surpassed ChatGPT, but it drew from Instagram’s user base, such that the comparison is of limited use. (<)em(>)See(<)/em(>) Siladitya Ray, (<)em(>)Threads Now Fastest-Growing App In History—With 100 Million Users In Just Five Days(<)/em(>), Forbes (July 10, 2023), (<)a href='https://www.forbes.com/sites/siladityaray/2023/07/10/with-100-million-users-in-five-days-threads-is-the-fastest-growing-app-in-history/'(>)https://www.forbes.com/sites/siladityaray/2023/07/10/with-100-million-users-in-five-days-threads-is-the-fastest-growing-app-in-history/(<)/a(>) (last visited July 7, 2025). it altered its business model and corresponding legal structure multiple times. Three main phases stand out: a non-profit startup lab to perform open research, a joint venture hybrid to raise private capital, and a public benefit corporation to combine profit and purpose.44On the transition to a capped-profit joint venture, see (<)em(>)OpenAI LP(<)/em(>), OpenAI, (2019), (<)a href='https://openai.com/index/openai-lp/'(>)https://openai.com/index/openai-lp/(<)/a(>) (“We want to increase our ability to raise capital while still serving our mission, and no pre-existing legal structure we know of strikes the right balance.”). On the move to a public benefit corporation, see (<)em(>)Evolving OpenAI’s Structure(<)/em(>), OpenAI, (May 5, 2025), (<)a href='https://openai.com/index/evolving-our-structure/'(>)https://openai.com/index/evolving-our-structure/(<)/a(>) (“We want to be able to operate and get resources in such a way that we can make our services broadly available to all of humanity, which currently requires hundreds of billions of dollars and may eventually require trillions of dollars.”). The final section of this report documents how attempts to move away from the original form were met with resistance.

1. The Genesis of OpenAI: Non-Profit Research Lab

OpenAI started as a non-profit, mission-driven countervailing force to Google/DeepMind in 2015.45Kevin Okemwa, (<)em(>)OpenAI Started as a “Countervailing Force” to Google—Did Elon Musk and Sam Altman Torpedo DeepMind’s Plans to Dictate AGI?(<)/em(>), Windows Cent. (June 26, 2025), (<)a href='https://www.windowscentral.com/software-apps/openai-started-as-a-countervailing-force-to-google'(>)https://www.windowscentral.com/software-apps/openai-started-as-a-countervailing-force-to-google(<)/a(>) (last visited Feb. 23, 2026). Worried about the threat of superhuman machine intelligence, especially if led by profit-driven, monopolistic Google, its founders sought an alternative way to build safe and beneficial AI technology.46(<)em(>)OpenAI Inc(<)/em(>), ProPublica: Nonprofit Explorer, (<)a href='https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/810861541'(>)https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/810861541(<)/a(>) (last visited Oct. 28, 2026). For more on the genesis of OpenAI, see Karen Hao, Empire of AI 46–53 (2025) and Merchant, (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 42, at 9–10. Its founders include Sam Altman, then president of tech startup accelerator Y Combinator; Greg Brockman, formerly chief technology officer of online payment processing platform Stripe; Elon Musk, CEO of Tesla and SpaceX; and Ilya Sutskever, renowned research scientist recruited from Google.

By organizing as a non-stock corporation with a non-profit status, OpenAI initially operated on donations, tax-free and shielded from the pressure to turn profits.47Tax documents list Elon Musk, Sam Altman and Chris Clark on the board of directors, and Chris Clark and Jonathan Levy as officers. Form 1023, (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 4, Supplemental Responses at 2–3. OpenAI, Inc. didn’t issue shares to raise capital, so it didn’t have to seek profit in order to pay dividends to shareholders. Instead, this “non-stock” corporation collected donations without an expectation of return on investment. CEO Sam Altman stated that “[w]e don’t ever want to be making decisions to benefit shareholders. The only people we want to be accountable to is humanity as a whole.”48Mosaic Ventures, (<)em(>)Mosaic Ventures in conversation with Y Combinator President, Sam Altman(<)/em(>), at 24:14 (YouTube, Mar. 28, 2017), (<)a href='https://www.mosaicventures.com/blog/mosaic-ventures-in-conversation-with-y-combinator-president-sam-altman'(>)https://www.mosaicventures.com/blog/mosaic-ventures-in-conversation-with-y-combinator-president-sam-altman(<)/a(>) [(<)a href='https://perma.cc/W5NV-SXTU'(>)https://perma.cc/W5NV-SXTU(<)/a(>)] (citation modified). (<)em(>)See also(<)/em(>) Web Desk, (<)em(>)Why OpenAI Is a Prime Example of the Ethical Limits of Capitalism(<)/em(>), Digit. Info. World (Dec. 9, 2025), (<)a href='https://www.digitalinformationworld.com/2025/12/why-openai-is-a-prime-example-of-the-ethical-limits-of-capitalism.html'(>)https://www.digitalinformationworld.com/2025/12/why-openai-is-a-prime-example-of-the-ethical-limits-of-capitalism.html(<)/a(>); Kelsey Piper, (<)em(>)OpenAI’s Nonprofit Structure Was Supposed to Protect You. What Went Wrong?(<)/em(>), Vox (Apr. 24, 2025), (<)a href='https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/410261/openai-non-profit-transition-letter-sam-altman-artificial-intelligence'(>)https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/410261/openai-non-profit-transition-letter-sam-altman-artificial-intelligence(<)/a(>). The initial funding pledges from its founders and other organizations amounted to $1 billion,49(<)em(>)Introducing OpenAI(<)/em(>), OpenAI, (2015), (<)a href='https://openai.com/index/introducing-openai/'(>)https://openai.com/index/introducing-openai/(<)/a(>) [(<)a href='https://perma.cc/9JWR-H5C5'(>)https://perma.cc/9JWR-H5C5(<)/a(>)] (claiming that several named private funders had “[i]n total . . . committed $1 billion”); (<)em(>)but see(<)/em(>) Mark Harris, (<)em(>)Elon Musk Used to Say He Put $100M in OpenAI, but Now It’s $50M: Here Are the Receipts(<)/em(>), TechCrunch (May 17, 2023), (<)a href='https://techcrunch.com/2023/05/17/elon-musk-used-to-say-he-put-100m-in-openai-but-now-its-50m-here-are-the-receipts/'(>)https://techcrunch.com/2023/05/17/elon-musk-used-to-say-he-put-100m-in-openai-but-now-its-50m-here-are-the-receipts/(<)/a(>) (noting that actual donations from the company’s inception to 2021 only amounted to $133 million); (<)em(>)see also(<)/em(>) ProPublica, (<)em(>)OpenAI Inc – Tax Filing – 990(<)/em(>) (2021), (<)a href='https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/810861541'(>)https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/810861541(<)/a(>). and its application to operate as a tax-exempt organization notes that it “does not plan to play any role in developing commercial products or equipment.”50OpenAI, (<)em(>)Internal Revenue Service Form 1023, supra(<)/em(>) note 4, at Part IV.

2. Pivot to “Capped-Profit” Structure

In 2019, the company sought more capital to sustain the compute infrastructure needed to scale AI. The conventional scaling paradigm consists in leveraging massive amounts of computation to achieve progress, so AI companies have massively invested in compute to process enormous amounts of data, and perform calculations at scale.51Richard Sutton, (<)em(>)The Bitter Lesson(<)/em(>), Incomplete Ideas (Mar. 13, 2019), (<)a href='http://www.incompleteideas.net/IncIdeas/BitterLesson.html'(>)http://www.incompleteideas.net/IncIdeas/BitterLesson.html(<)/a(>), [(<)a href='https://perma.cc/VB2B-FVXR'(>)https://perma.cc/VB2B-FVXR(<)/a(>)] (scaling with more compute power yields the most improvements in machine learning); (<)em(>)see also(<)/em(>) Jai Vipra & Sarah M. West, (<)em(>)Computational Power and AI(<)/em(>), AI Now Institute 4 (Sep. 27, 2023), (<)a href='https://ainowinstitute.org/publications/compute-and-ai'(>)https://ainowinstitute.org/publications/compute-and-ai(<)/a(>) [(<)a href='https://perma.cc/QD3G-WSXE'(>)https://perma.cc/QD3G-WSXE(<)/a(>)] (defining compute as the combination of chips, graphic processing unit software, domain-specific languages, data management software and data center infrastructure such as connecting cables, servers and cooling equipment); Jared Kaplan et al., (<)em(>)Scaling Laws for Neural Language Models(<)/em(>) (Jan. 23, 2020), (<)a href='http://arxiv.org/abs/2001.08361'(>)http://arxiv.org/abs/2001.08361(<)/a(>); (<)em(>)but see(<)/em(>) Andrew Lohn, (<)em(>)Scaling AI(<)/em(>), Geo. Ctr. for Sec. & Emerging Tech., (<)a href='https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/scaling-ai/'(>)https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/scaling-ai/(<)/a(>) (last visited Feb. 18, 2025) (calling into question the future of scaling due to diminishing returns). In the span of two years alone, OpenAI’s computing costs jumped from $2.3 to $30.5 million.52(<)em(>)OpenAI Inc 2016 Tax Filing(<)/em(>), (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 46; (<)em(>)OpenAI Inc – Tax Filing – 990(<)/em(>), ProPublica (2018), (<)a href='https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/810861541'(>)https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/810861541(<)/a(>). To finance this massive expense, it noted on its website that it needed to offer more attractive investment opportunities through a self-styled “capped-profit” business structure, a bespoke investment vehicle that distributed profits up to a predetermined multiple of the initial investment.53Alexandra Andhov, (<)em(>)OpenAI’s Transformation: From a Non-Profit to a 157 Billion Valuation(<)/em(>), 46 Bus. L. Rev. 2, 9 (2025), (<)a href='https://kluwerlawonline.com/api/Product/CitationPDFURL?file=Journals%5CBULA%5CBULA2025003.pdf'(>)https://kluwerlawonline.com/api/Product/CitationPDFURL?file=Journals\BULA\BULA2025003.pdf(<)/a(>) (describing OpenAI’s “capped-profit” model while noting that “capped-profit” is an entirely novel concept that “lacks legal standing and recognition”).

Though framed as a transition to a single limited partnership (or L.P., a well-established legal entity explicitly recognized under Delaware law), the resulting corporate structure actually consisted of at least 20 interlocking legal entities evolving over time.54For a more detailed account of OpenAI’s corporate structure, see (<)em(>)The OpenAI Files(<)/em(>), (<)a href='https://www.openaifiles.org/restructuring'(>)https://www.openaifiles.org/restructuring(<)/a(>) [(<)a href='https://perma.cc/BU5X-PUCM'(>)https://perma.cc/BU5X-PUCM(<)/a(>)] (last visited July 4, 2025) (including educated guesses about subsidiaries); (<)em(>)see also(<)/em(>) Andhov, (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 53, at 8–9 (mapping parent companies and subsidiaries). Taken together, this fleet of companies formed a joint venture with the non-profit, raising capital through tailored and confidential contractual agreements. Nominally overseen by the original non-profit corporation, several for-profit legal entities offered equity to raise capital investors and attract employees. Figure 6 outlines the main entities involved in the capped-profit business model of OpenAI, with each one detailed below.

Figure 6: OpenAI Capped-Profit Structure.

Non-Profit OpenAI Inc. Retains Ultimate Control Over Subsidiaries

This is the original non-profit OpenAI legal structure. As a non-stock corporation, it doesn’t issue stock to shareholders. Instead, members hold rights similar to shareholders.55OpenAI, (<)em(>)Certificate of Incorporation and Bylaws(<)/em(>), (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 40, Art. II (reflecting that the members of OpenAI Inc. are the directors of the corporation). It was the “mothership” of the OpenAI nexus, technically controlling all other entities. Some board members were also employees whose compensation depended on the company’s valuation, but they did not vote on decisions that could trigger conflicts of interest.56(<)em(>)Id.(<)/em(>) at Art. VII (requiring that only disinterested board members vote on such matters); (<)em(>)see also(<)/em(>) Darryll K. Jones, (<)em(>)The OpenAI Corporate Structure(<)/em(>), Nonprofit L. Prof Blog (Jan. 8, 2024), (<)a href='https://web.archive.org/web/20250618175534/https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/nonprofit/2024/01/the-openai-corporate-structure.html'(>)https://web.archive.org/web/20250618175534/https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/nonprofit/2024/01/the-openai-corporate-structure.html(<)/a(>) (last visited July 7, 2025) (pointing out that some directors’ compensation is tied to OpenAI’s market performance). Under IRS rules for tax-exempt entities, profits belong to the charity.57I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). Employee and executive compensation must be at market rates.58(<)em(>)Id.(<)/em(>) § 4958.

OpenAI GP LLC Controls For-Profit Entities

This limited liability company was designed to allow the original non-profit portion of the OpenAI ecosystem to control its various for-profit components. Concretely, the non-profit OpenAI Inc. was the sole member of OpenAI GP LLC, which in turn controlled two for-profit companies: OpenAI LP and OpenAI Global LLC. 

Holding Company OpenAI LP Distributes Profits to Early Investors and Employees

OpenAI shifted the majority of its employees from the non-profit to OpenAI LP.59(<)em(>)OpenAI LP,(<)/em(>) OpenAI, (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 44. As a limited partnership, it consisted of general partners managing operations and limited partners investing in the for-profit company. OpenAI GP LLC was the sole manager, giving the board of non-profit OpenAI Inc. full control over OpenAI LP. In terms of ownership, investors and employees were limited partners of OpenAI LP. The return of early investors was capped at 100x their investment, a rate expected to lower in future funding rounds.60(<)em(>)OpenAI LP,(<)/em(>) OpenAI, (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 44, at 5; (<)em(>)but see(<)/em(>) Andhov, (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 53, at 9 (noting that the malleable partnership agreement could modify the cap). Microsoft then invested $1 billion in cash and compute credits on its Azure platform, with the exact return cap never made public. To attract sought-after talent, employees got “profit participation units” (PPUs), which were essentially contractual rights to a share of future profits in lieu of stock in traditional corporations.61Nino Paoli, (<)em(>)Mark Zuckerberg Has a Literal List of AI All-Stars to Whom He’s Offering Fantastic Sums of Money. An Expert Explains Why He’s Hiring so Aggressively(<)/em(>), Fortune (July 1, 2025), (<)a href='https://fortune.com/2025/07/01/mark-zuckerberg-meta-superintelligence-lab-team-list-openai-edgar-perez/'(>)https://fortune.com/2025/07/01/mark-zuckerberg-meta-superintelligence-lab-team-list-openai-edgar-perez/(<)/a(>) (last visited July 4, 2025). Employees were offered participation capped at 10x the value at the time of hiring.62Brian Nguyen, (<)em(>)OpenAI PPUs: How OpenAI’s Unique Equity Compensation Works(<)/em(>), Levels.fyi Blog (June 19, 2023), (<)a href='https://www.levels.fyi/blog/openai-compensation.html'(>)https://www.levels.fyi/blog/openai-compensation.html(<)/a(>) [(<)a href='https://perma.cc/7V4E-DL8U'(>)https://perma.cc/7V4E-DL8U(<)/a(>)]. Employees could sell these PPUs to investors when the company triggered a tender offer, as it did in 2024 at a $157 billion valuation.63(<)em(>)Id.(<)/em(>); (<)em(>)see also(<)/em(>) Jack Raines, (<)em(>)OpenAI Isn’t Selling Equity—It’s Selling Shares of Profits That May Never Come. Investors Can’t Get Enough(<)/em(>), Sherwood News (Sep. 10, 2024), (<)a href='https://sherwood.news/business/openai-isnt-selling-equity-its-selling-shares-of-profits-that-may-never-come/'(>)https://sherwood.news/business/openai-isnt-selling-equity-its-selling-shares-of-profits-that-may-never-come/(<)/a(>) (last visited June 30, 2025); Sherin Shibu, (<)em(>)Some OpenAI Employees Are About to Become Millionaires(<)/em(>), Entrepreneur (Dec. 18, 2024), (<)a href='https://www.entrepreneur.com/business-news/some-openai-employees-are-about-to-become-millionaires/484488'(>)https://www.entrepreneur.com/business-news/some-openai-employees-are-about-to-become-millionaires/484488(<)/a(>). To give a sense of the magnitude of profits employees stood to make, OpenAI’s valuation grew 10x from 2023 to 2025, from $29 to $300 billion. In the late 2024 tender offer, each eligible employee could sell up to $10 million in vested PPUs, with SoftBank committing $1.6 billion to buy from roughly 400 current and former staff; a subsequent October 2025 offer raised the individual cap to $30 million, with approximately 75 employees selling the maximum, and 600 employees collectively liquidating $6.6 billion in PPUs.64(<)em(>)Deals – OpenAI – Company Profile(<)/em(>), Pitchbook, (<)a href='https://content.pitchbook.com/share/quick-link/profile/170ba480-ba15-4b9e-96dc-9ff5022e2634?hash=2cc522aca06a7b95f74a376a96ac94ec762545095cda670c5257f355aa7cf312'(>)https://content.pitchbook.com/share/quick-link/profile/170ba480-ba15-4b9e-96dc-9ff5022e2634?hash=2cc522aca06a7b95f74a376a96ac94ec762545095cda670c5257f355aa7cf312(<)/a(>) (last visited July 18, 2025); (<)em(>)New Funding to Build towards AGI(<)/em(>), OpenAI (Mar. 31, 2025), (<)a href='https://openai.com/index/march-funding-updates/'(>)https://openai.com/index/march-funding-updates/(<)/a(>) (last visited July 18, 2025); Kyle Wiggers, (<)em(>)OpenAI Raises $6.6B and Is Now Valued at $157B(<)/em(>), TechCrunch (Oct. 2, 2024), (<)a href='https://techcrunch.com/2024/10/02/openai-raises-6-6b-and-is-now-valued-at-157b/'(>)https://techcrunch.com/2024/10/02/openai-raises-6-6b-and-is-now-valued-at-157b/(<)/a(>); Berber Jin, (<)em(>)How a Job at OpenAI Became the Greatest Lottery Ticket of the AI Boom(<)/em(>), Wall St. J. (May 11, 2026), https://www.wsj.com/tech/openai-employee-stock-sales-71ed10bd; Sharon Goldman, (<)em(>)Hundreds of OpenAI’s Current and Ex-Employees Are About to Get a Huge Payday by Cashing Out up to $10 Million Each in a Private Stock Sale(<)/em(>), Fortune (Dec. 17, 2024), (<)a href='https://fortune.com/2024/12/17/hundreds-openai-employees-10-million-payday-softbank-stock-tender-offer-details/'(>)https://fortune.com/2024/12/17/hundreds-openai-employees-10-million-payday-softbank-stock-tender-offer-details/(<)/a(>).

The inner workings of the LP remain out of the public eye. An excerpt of the partnership agreement stipulates that the “[p]artnership exists to advance OpenAI Inc’s mission of ensuring that safe artificial general intelligence is developed and benefits all of humanity,” noting that the mission takes precedence over profit-making obligations.65(<)em(>)OpenAI LP,(<)/em(>) OpenAI, (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 44. The tax filings of the non-profit arm also indicate that the partnership agreement prioritizes the non-profit mission over profits,66OpenAI Inc – Tax Filing – 990, at 49, ProPublica (2021), (<)a href='https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/810861541/202243199349314989/full'(>)https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/810861541/202243199349314989/full(<)/a(>). but the precise mechanics of the profit-sharing distribution and decision-making processes remain confidential.67Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 17-201 (2024) (requiring the publicly filed certificate of limited partnership to set forth only the partnership’s name, registered office and agent, and general partners, not the partnership agreement); (<)em(>)see also(<)/em(>) (<)em(>)OpenAI LP(<)/em(>), OpenAI, (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 44 (disclosing only the excerpt that opens investor and employee paperwork). Based on confidential documents, Fortune magazine reported that profits would initially flow to investors and employees, then would go towards the non-profit.68Jessica Mathews & Jeremy Kahn, (<)em(>)Inside the Structure of OpenAI’s Looming New Investment from Microsoft and VCs(<)/em(>), Fortune, Jan. 11, 2023, (<)a href='https://fortune.com/2023/01/11/structure-openai-investment-microsoft/'(>)https://fortune.com/2023/01/11/structure-openai-investment-microsoft/(<)/a(>) [(<)a href='https://perma.cc/FV45-WNJV'(>)https://perma.cc/FV45-WNJV(<)/a(>)] (last visited Nov. 25, 2024). The LP was a majority owner of the second for-profit company, OpenAI LLC.

For-Profit OpenAI Global LLC in Partnership With Microsoft 

In order to finance its massive investment in computation power, OpenAI ramped up its partnership with technology giant Microsoft through this limited liability company. In 2023, Microsoft invested over $10 billion in return for a “minority economic interest” in the company’s profits.69 (<)em(>)Our Structure(<)/em(>), OpenAI, (<)a href='https://openai.com/our-structure/'(>)https://openai.com/our-structure/(<)/a(>) (last visited Feb. 9, 2025) [(<)a href='https://web.archive.org/web/20250210080054/https://openai.com/our-structure/'(>)https://web.archive.org/web/20250210080054/https://openai.com/our-structure/(<)/a(>)]; Alex Hern & Lisa O’Carroll, (<)em(>)Microsoft’s Investment in OpenAI May Face EU Scrutiny, Officials Say(<)/em(>), Guardian (Jan. 9, 2024), (<)a href='https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2024/jan/09/microsoft-investment-openai-chatgpt-european-union-eu-merger-investigation'(>)https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2024/jan/09/microsoft-investment-openai-chatgpt-european-union-eu-merger-investigation(<)/a(>) (noting that OpenAI previously described Microsoft as a minority owner but changed the description as merger scrutiny increased). For details about the profit-distribution arrangements, see Kahn, (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 23. The cap on Microsoft’s January 2023 $10 billion investment is not public, but reporting suggests a fork between 20x and “single digits.” Hao, (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 46 (reporting a 20x cap on $1 billion investment in June 2019); The Ezra Klein Show, (<)em(>)Sam Altman on the A.I. Revolution, Trillionaires and the Future of Political Power(<)/em(>), (N.Y. Times, June 11, 2021), (<)a href='https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/11/opinion/ezra-klein-podcast-sam-altman.html'(>)https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/11/opinion/ezra-klein-podcast-sam-altman.html(<)/a(>) (reporting a single digit cap in June 2021); Matt Levine et al., (<)em(>)Who Owns OpenAI?(<)/em(>), Bloomberg (Oct. 21, 2024), (<)a href='https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2024-10-21/who-owns-openai'(>)https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2024-10-21/who-owns-openai(<)/a(>) (breaking down the profit distribution among various investors).The non-profit arm retained full control as the sole manager of the LLC (via OpenAI GP LLC), and owned a majority stake via OpenAI LP. The operating agreement of a limited liability company is off-limits to the public, save for excerpts the company voluntarily disclosed. The public excerpt reiterates the above warning that mission overrides profit, cautioning that “it would be wise to view an investment in OpenAI Global, LLC. in the spirit of a donation,” as no return on investment is guaranteed.70(<)em(>)Our Structure(<)/em(>), OpenAI, (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 69. That said, the governance crisis detailed below suggests that profit-oriented actors had significant sway despite lacking a formal say in the company’s decision-making process.

3. Governance Challenges with Capped-Profit Structure

The bespoke capped-profit structure sought to ensure that the non-profit board retained total control of all the for-profit entities to safeguard the mission over profits.71Ellen P. Aprill, Rose C. Loui & Jill R. Horwitz, (<)em(>)Board Control of a Charity’s Subsidiaries: The Saga of OpenAI(<)/em(>), 182 Tax Notes Fed. 289, 292–93 (2024), (<)a href='https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=4720202'(>)https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=4720202(<)/a(>). Yet power struggles over the leadership of OpenAI indicate a disconnect between formal and de facto control, with profit-driven stakeholders like Microsoft holding the lion’s share of power despite no official vote.72Frederik H. Pedersen, (<)em(>)Ownership at OpenAI: From the Perspective of Enterprise Foundation Governance(<)/em(>) (Apr. 15, 2024) (unpublished manuscript), (<)a href='https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=4795279'(>)https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=4795279(<)/a(>). The failed ouster of CEO Sam Altman suggests that de facto pressure from employees and investors overrode the board’s formal control. In November 2023, the board fired Altman on the grounds that he “was not consistently candid in his communications.”73(<)em(>)OpenAI Announces Leadership Transition(<)/em(>), OpenAI (Nov. 17, 2023), (<)a href='https://openai.com/index/openai-announces-leadership-transition/'(>)https://openai.com/index/openai-announces-leadership-transition/(<)/a(>). For a deeper analysis of the factors leading to Altman’s firing, including safety concerns with rapid commercialization, see Hao, (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 46, at 355-76; Olson, (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 13, at 269-79. Though the full story remains murky,74(<)em(>)Review completed & Altman, Brockman to continue to lead OpenAI(<)/em(>), OpenAI (Mar. 8, 2024), (<)a href='https://openai.com/index/review-completed-altman-brockman-to-continue-to-lead-openai/'(>)https://openai.com/index/review-completed-altman-brockman-to-continue-to-lead-openai/(<)/a(>) (claiming that Altman’s behavior “did not mandate removal,” which instead resulted from “a breakdown in trust between the prior Board and Mr. Altman”); Hayden Field, (<)em(>)Former OpenAI Board Member Explains Why CEO Sam Altman Got Fired before He Was Rehired(<)/em(>), CNBC (May 29, 2024), (<)a href='https://www.cnbc.com/2024/05/29/former-openai-board-member-explains-why-ceo-sam-altman-was-fired.html'(>)https://www.cnbc.com/2024/05/29/former-openai-board-member-explains-why-ceo-sam-altman-was-fired.html(<)/a(>) (alleging that Altman withheld information, made material misrepresentations, and outright lied to the board). the role of powerful constituencies to override the board appears quite clear. The board reversed course, in no small part due to employee and investor pressure. Not only was Altman reinstated, but the board members who had attempted to fire him resigned, flipping the governance structure on its head. The influence of employees and investors points to a disconnect between the governance of OpenAI on paper and the gravitational pull of other actors in reality. These “superstakeholders”75(<)em(>)Developments in the Law—Amoral Drifts in Corporate AI Governance(<)/em(>), (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 10, at 1653. (<)em(>)See also(<)/em(>) Pedersen, (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 72; Aprill, Loui & Horwitz, (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 71 (both noting the (<)em(>)de facto(<)/em(>) pull of Altman and equity holders). lack a formal vote on the board, but hold formidable sway over the company. The two sections below explain the leverage and influence of employees and investors over the company’s decisions. 

Employees Mobilizing for Altman

Employees contributed to Altman’s reinstatement by threatening to quit en masse in protest of his firing.76Jacob Kastrenakes, (<)em(>)Hundreds of OpenAI Employees Threaten to Resign and Join Microsoft(<)/em(>), Verge (Nov. 20, 2023), (<)a href='https://www.theverge.com/2023/11/20/23968988/openai-employees-resignation-letter-microsoft-sam-altman'(>)https://www.theverge.com/2023/11/20/23968988/openai-employees-resignation-letter-microsoft-sam-altman(<)/a(>); Cade Metz et al., (<)em(>)Sam Altman Is Reinstated as OpenAI’s Chief Executive(<)/em(>), N.Y. Times (Nov. 22, 2023), (<)a href='https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/22/technology/openai-sam-altman-returns.html'(>)https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/22/technology/openai-sam-altman-returns.html(<)/a(>). Without its highly sought-after specialized workforce, OpenAI would have come to a halt. Employees thus had significant leverage when they rallied around Altman. Perhaps not coincidentally, Altman’s firing occurred as the company was gearing up for a tender offer. This opportunity for employees to cash out on their PPUs was tied to the company’s valuation, and the upheaval in OpenAI’s leadership threatened to erase the total $86 billion valuation—more than a 50% jump in a matter of a few months.77PitchBook Profile – OpenAI, (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 6 (reporting OpenAI’s $29 billion valuation in April 2023 and $86 billion valuation in January 2024); Reuters, (<)em(>)OpenAI’s $86 Billion Share Sale in Jeopardy after Altman Firing, The Information Reports(<)/em(>), Reuters (Nov. 18, 2023), (<)a href='https://www.reuters.com/technology/openais-86-bln-share-sale-jeopardy-following-altman-firing-information-2023-11-18/'(>)https://www.reuters.com/technology/openais-86-bln-share-sale-jeopardy-following-altman-firing-information-2023-11-18/(<)/a(>). This created a powerful incentive for employees to put their weight behind Altman to restore continuity and preserve the value of their equity—typically more than half their compensation.78Paolo Confino, (<)em(>)OpenAI’s Meltdown: What to Know about Sam Altman’s Ouster, the Employee Revolt, and Microsoft’s Plot Twist(<)/em(>), Fortune, Nov. 20, 2023, (<)a href='https://fortune.com/2023/11/20/openai-sam-altman-microsoft-ai-what-happened/'(>)https://fortune.com/2023/11/20/openai-sam-altman-microsoft-ai-what-happened/(<)/a(>) (last visited July 4, 2025); Reuters, (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 77; Nguyen, (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 62 (describing an OpenAI offer for a Member of Technical Staff position stipulating base salary of $300,000 and equity worth of $800,000 with a 10x profit cap). 

Major Investors

As of Altman’s firing, Microsoft had committed $13 billion to OpenAI.79Jordan Novet, (<)em(>)Microsoft’s $13 Billion Bet on OpenAI Carries Huge Potential along with Plenty of Uncertainty(<)/em(>), CNBC (Apr. 8, 2023), (<)a href='https://www.cnbc.com/2023/04/08/microsofts-complex-bet-on-openai-brings-potential-and-uncertainty.html'(>)https://www.cnbc.com/2023/04/08/microsofts-complex-bet-on-openai-brings-potential-and-uncertainty.html(<)/a(>). The leading investor at the time, it carried significant weight despite lacking a voice in OpenAI’s formal governance.80Max Chafkin & Dina Bass, (<)em(>)Microsoft’s Sudden AI Dominance Is Scrambling Silicon Valley’s Power Structure(<)/em(>), Bloomberg (June 15, 2023), (<)a href='https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2023-06-15/microsoft-prepares-to-cash-in-on-openai-partnership-with-copilot'(>)https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2023-06-15/microsoft-prepares-to-cash-in-on-openai-partnership-with-copilot(<)/a(>) (describing a 30% increase in Microsoft’s share value after the success of ChatGPT). As a publicly listed company whose own valuation was tied to the lab’s performance, Microsoft presumably prioritized a leadership that would align with its vision to ship profitable products. When the sudden ouster of Altman threatened to throw OpenAI into disarray, Microsoft could have withheld billions of undisbursed investment and computing infrastructure critical to OpenAI’s activities. It is also deeply intertwined in OpenAI’s supply chain, leading its CEO to note that “We are in there. We are below them, above them, around them. We do the kernel optimizations, we build tools, we build the infrastructure.”81Intelligencer Staff, (<)em(>)Satya Nadella on Hiring the Most Powerful Man in AI(<)/em(>), Intelligencer (Nov. 21, 2023), (<)a href='https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2023/11/on-with-kara-swisher-satya-nadella-on-hiring-sam-altman.html'(>)https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2023/11/on-with-kara-swisher-satya-nadella-on-hiring-sam-altman.html(<)/a(>). In addition to providing OpenAI with essential infrastructure, Microsoft had licensing rights giving it preferential access to OpenAI technology.82Microsoft Corporate Blogs, (<)em(>)Microsoft and OpenAI Evolve Partnership to Drive the next Phase of AI(<)/em(>), The Official Microsoft Blog (Jan. 21, 2025), (<)a href='https://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2025/01/21/microsoft-and-openai-evolve-partnership-to-drive-the-next-phase-of-ai/'(>)https://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2025/01/21/microsoft-and-openai-evolve-partnership-to-drive-the-next-phase-of-ai/(<)/a(>) (describing Microsoft’s exclusive access to the OpenAI API for Azure and rights to OpenAI IP for Copilot). Investor and employee pressure also compounded, as Microsoft’s standing offer to absorb any OpenAI employee who resigned gave the threat of a mass walkout real teeth.83Tom Gerken, (<)em(>)Microsoft Offers to Match Pay of All OpenAI Staff(<)/em(>), BBC (Nov. 21, 2023), (<)a href='https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-67484455'(>)https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-67484455(<)/a(>); (<)em(>)but see(<)/em(>) Kali Hays, Ashley Rafieyan & Darius Stewart, (<)em(>)OpenAI Employees Really, Really Did Not Want to Go Work for Microsoft(<)/em(>), Bus. Insider (Dec. 6, 2023), (<)a href='https://www.businessinsider.com/openai-employees-did-not-want-to-work-for-microsoft-2023-12'(>)https://www.businessinsider.com/openai-employees-did-not-want-to-work-for-microsoft-2023-12(<)/a(>) (last visited July 7, 2025) (reporting that employees were privately dreading leaving an agile startup for the “biggest and slowest” big tech company). 

Although the non-profit board technically controlled every for-profit entity downstream, the outcome of its power struggle to fire Altman indicates that investors and employees actually called the shots. As nonprofit consumer advocates noted, it seemed as if the for-profit component effectively controlled the non-profit component of OpenAI.84Robert Weissman, (<)em(>)Letter to California Attorney General on OpenAI’s Nonprofit Status(<)/em(>), Public Citizen (Jan. 9, 2024), (<)a href='https://www.citizen.org/article/letter-to-california-attorney-general-on-openais-nonprofit-status/'(>)https://www.citizen.org/article/letter-to-california-attorney-general-on-openais-nonprofit-status/(<)/a(>) (calling into question effective non-profit control after the board’s ouster). This calls into question the board’s ability to put the public interest mission above the profit-aligned interests of these superstakeholders.85Tim Bradshaw et al., (<)em(>)How Microsoft’s Multibillion-Dollar Alliance with OpenAI Really Works(<)/em(>), Fin. Times (Dec. 15, 2023), (<)a href='https://www.ft.com/content/458b162d-c97a-4464-8afc-72d65afb28ed'(>)https://www.ft.com/content/458b162d-c97a-4464-8afc-72d65afb28ed(<)/a(>) (describing Microsoft’s pressure to ship products as it “really wanted to be deploying AI products and be an AI leader and make money”); Robert Weissman, (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 84, at 3–4 (describing a consensus view that for-profit interests overtook the non-profit interests). Indeed, the pressure to make profitable products strained the capped-profit model, so much so that the company considered abandoning its non-profit vocation altogether. The company faced pressure in opposite directions: profit-oriented stakeholders wanted a switch to a for-profit model86Hayden Field & Kate Rooney, (<)em(>)OpenAI Funding Round Could Be Cut by $10 Billion If For-Profit Conversion Doesn’t Occur by Year-End(<)/em(>), CNBC (Mar. 31, 2025), (<)a href='https://www.cnbc.com/2025/03/31/openai-funding-could-be-cut-by-10-billion-if-for-profit-move-lags.html'(>)https://www.cnbc.com/2025/03/31/openai-funding-could-be-cut-by-10-billion-if-for-profit-move-lags.html(<)/a(>) (reporting that SoftBank’s portion of an OpenAI investment round would decrease by $10 billion if OpenAI remained a non-profit). that would have removed the non-profit from its controlling position,87(<)em(>)Why OpenAI’s Structure Must Evolve to Advance Our Mission(<)/em(>), OpenAI (Dec. 27, 2024), (<)a href='https://openai.com/index/why-our-structure-must-evolve-to-advance-our-mission/'(>)https://openai.com/index/why-our-structure-must-evolve-to-advance-our-mission/(<)/a(>) (last visited June 27, 2025) (proposing to split the company into distinct entities, with a non-profit and a public benefit corporation directly responsive to investors); (<)em(>)see also(<)/em(>) Rose C. Loui, (<)em(>)Can OpenAI Abandon Its Non-Profit “Purpose”?(<)/em(>), ProMarket (Apr. 23, 2025), (<)a href='https://www.promarket.org/2025/04/23/can-openai-abandon-its-non-profit-purpose/'(>)https://www.promarket.org/2025/04/23/can-openai-abandon-its-non-profit-purpose/(<)/a(>). whereas some early investors, former employees, competitors and observers opposed departures from the non-profit commitments.88(<)em(>)Musk v. Altman,(<)/em(>) No. 4:24-cv-04722 (N.D. Cal. 2026) (alleging unjust enrichment based on false claims that OpenAI was a safety-oriented non-profit organization); (<)em(>)Not For Private Gain(<)/em(>) (Apr. 12, 2025), (<)a href='https://notforprivategain.org/'(>)https://notforprivategain.org(<)/a(>) (former employees and corporate governance experts expressing concerns about safeguarding the mission under a for-profit model); Alex Heath, (<)em(>)Meta Asks the Government to Block OpenAI’s Switch to a for-Profit(<)/em(>), Verge (Dec. 13, 2024), (<)a href='https://www.theverge.com/2024/12/13/24320880/meta-california-ag-letter-openai-non-profit-elon-musk'(>)https://www.theverge.com/2024/12/13/24320880/meta-california-ag-letter-openai-non-profit-elon-musk(<)/a(>) (reporting on Meta’s claims that “if OpenAI’s new business model is valid, non-profit investors would get the same for-profit upside as those who invest the conventional way in for-profit companies while also benefiting from tax write-offs bestowed by the government and, ultimately, the public,” and that “[t]hat would distort the market by essentially requiring any startup seeking to remain competitive to adopt the same playbook.”); Loui, (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 87; Krystal Hu et al., (<)em(>)OpenAI Dials Back Conversion Plan, Nonprofit to Retain Control(<)/em(>), Reuters (May 5, 2025), (<)a href='https://www.reuters.com/business/openai-remain-under-non-profit-control-change-restructuring-plans-2025-05-05/'(>)https://www.reuters.com/business/openai-remain-under-non-profit-control-change-restructuring-plans-2025-05-05/(<)/a(>) (last visited June 25, 2025); (<)em(>)An Open Letter to OpenAI(<)/em(>), (<)a href='https://www.openai-transparency.org/'(>)https://www.openai-transparency.org/(<)/a(>) (last visited Sep. 23, 2025); Letter to California Attorney General on OpenAI’s Nonprofit Status, (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 84; (<)em(>)Coalition for AI Nonprofit Integrity(<)/em(>), (<)a href='https://ab501.com/'(>)https://ab501.com/(<)/a(>)[https://web.archive.org/web/20250416225539/https://ab501.com/] (last visited Sep. 4, 2025). As a middle ground, the company has pivoted to a public benefit corporation that maintains the controlling position of the non-profit but allows it to make profits.

4. Public Benefit Corporation Reorganization

OpenAI restructured as a public benefit corporation (PBC) in October 2025, with the mission to “ensure that artificial general intelligence benefits all of humanity, including by conducting and/or funding artificial intelligence research.”89(<)em(>)Certificate of Incorporation of OpenAI Group PBC(<)/em(>), art. III (2025). The original non-profit, now called the OpenAI Foundation, holds 26% of stock in the public benefit corporation, leaving Microsoft with 27% and employees and other investors with the remaining 47%.90(<)em(>)Our Structure,(<)/em(>) OpenAI, (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 69. Funded by its shares in the PBC, the Foundation focuses on philanthropy.91(<)em(>)Evolving OpenAI’s Structure(<)/em(>), OpenAI, (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 44 (aspiring to set up “the largest and most effective nonprofit in history that will be focused on using AI to enable the highest-leverage outcomes for people”); (<)em(>)see also(<)/em(>) (<)em(>)OpenAI Board of Directors Announces Advisors to Nonprofit Commission(<)/em(>), (<)a href='https://openai.com/index/nonprofit-commission-advisors/'(>)https://openai.com/index/nonprofit-commission-advisors/(<)/a(>) (last visited July 8, 2025) (setting up a commission to inform philanthropic efforts); (<)em(>)Our Structure(<)/em(>), OpenAI, (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 69. In addition to its current 26% stake, the Foundation stands to gain additional shares if share prices grow tenfold over 15 years.92(<)em(>)Our Structure(<)/em(>), OpenAI, (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 69. The Foundation’s financial interest in the PBC fundamentally misaligns the governance structure, as its own stake in the company’s share value undermines its ability to prioritize the mission over profits. Given that the new structure removed the profit caps that guaranteed the non-profit would eventually reap 100% of the profits, some have also construed the reorganization as shortchanging the non-profit.93The Midas Project, (<)em(>)The Midas Project Statement on OpenAI’s Restructuring(<)/em(>) (Oct. 28, 2025), (<)a href='https://www.themidasproject.com/articles/the-midas-project-statement-on-openais-restructuring'(>)https://www.themidasproject.com/articles/the-midas-project-statement-on-openais-restructuring(<)/a(>) (last visited Nov. 27, 2025). 

Control-wise, the Foundation appoints the board of the PBC.94(<)em(>)Certificate of Incorporation of OpenAI Group PBC(<)/em(>), (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 89, art. IV.2(b)(i) (describing the voting power of the Class N common stock shares owned by the Foundation); Ann M. O’Leary & William Savitt, (<)em(>)Response to Petition for Attorney General Action To Protect The Charitable Nature Of OpenAI’s Assets(<)/em(>), 7 (2025); (<)em(>)Evolving OpenAI’s Structure(<)/em(>), OpenAI, (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 44 (noting that “[w]e made the decision for the nonprofit to retain control of OpenAI after hearing from civic leaders and engaging in constructive dialogue with the offices of the Attorney General of Delaware and the Attorney General of California”). All but one of the directors of the Foundation are also on the PBC board, and within a year two directors will serve exclusively on the Foundation’s board.95(<)em(>)Our Structure(<)/em(>), OpenAI, (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 69. With the PBC board essentially a subset of the Foundation, there are concerns that the non-profit’s only actual power is to fire itself.96The Midas Project, (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 93. Furthermore, the other profit-oriented shareholders retain the capacity to fire a third of the PBC’s board.97(<)em(>)Certificate of Incorporation of OpenAI Group PBC(<)/em(>), (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 89, art. V.3 (stating a maximum number of director removals for a 12-month period by shareholders other than the board and requiring a 2/3 majority to proceed).

Figure 7: OpenAI’s Public Benefit Corporation restructuring.

Despite some safeguards, the PBC restructuring weakens OpenAI’s already brittle governance. The attorneys general of Delaware and California extracted some commitments to the non-profit mission in exchange for withholding their objections to the reorganization.98Khari Johnson & Levi Sumagaysay, (<)em(>)OpenAI Just Cut a Deal with California. Critics Say It’s Full of Holes(<)/em(>), CalMatters (Oct. 30, 2025), (<)a href='https://calmatters.org/economy/technology/2025/10/openai-restructuring-deal-full-of-holes-critics-say/'(>)https://calmatters.org/economy/technology/2025/10/openai-restructuring-deal-full-of-holes-critics-say/(<)/a(>); Chase Difeliciantonio & Christine Mui, (<)em(>)OpenAI Gets Green Light from California for Multibillion-Dollar Makeover, but Still Faces Hurdles(<)/em(>), Politico (Oct. 28, 2025), (<)a href='https://www.politico.com/news/2025/10/28/openai-business-restructuring-california-00625383'(>)https://www.politico.com/news/2025/10/28/openai-business-restructuring-california-00625383(<)/a(>); Matthew Marshall, (<)em(>)AG Jennings Completes Review of OpenAI Recapitalization(<)/em(>), State Del. News (Oct. 28, 2025), (<)a href='https://news.delaware.gov/2025/10/28/ag-jennings-completes-review-of-openai-recapitalization/'(>)https://news.delaware.gov/2025/10/28/ag-jennings-completes-review-of-openai-recapitalization/(<)/a(>). A Safety and Security Committee has to remain under the control of the Foundation and retains a right of approval over safety and security matters, including the ability to halt the release of models and systems.99Rob Bonta, Att’y Gen. of Cal. & OpenAI, Inc., Memorandum of Understanding, ¶¶ 9–11 (Oct. 27, 2025) [hereinafter CA MOU]; Letter from Kathleen Jennings, Att’y Gen. of Del., to Che Chang, Gen. Counsel, OpenAI, Inc., re: OpenAI, Inc.’s Corporate Restructuring ¶¶ 7-9 (Oct. 28, 2025) [hereinafter DE MOU].  The PBC’s board also has to focus on the mission in matters of safety and security, to the exclusion of the financial interest of shareholders.100CA MOU, (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 99, ¶ 8; DE MOU, (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 99, ¶ 6; (<)em(>)Certificate of Incorporation of OpenAI Group PBC(<)/em(>), (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 89, art. III (“[T]he Board of Directors of the Corporation (the ‘Board of Directors’) must solely consider the Mission (and may not consider the pecuniary interests of stockholders or any other interest) in respect of safety and security issues related to the OpenAI enterprise [. . .].”). However, these commitments may not work well in practice. For context, the former structure had even stronger incentives to prioritize the mission over profits: assets locked in a non-profit and no shareholders pressing for profit. And even then, it could not carry out the firing of the CEO, let alone prevent the PBC restructuring which introduced profit-driven shareholders in the governance structure.

More broadly, the PBC structure is itself limited when it comes to enforcing the mission. OpenAI frames it as a “purpose-driven company structure that has to consider the interests of both shareholders and the mission.”101(<)em(>)Evolving OpenAI’s Structure(<)/em(>), OpenAI, (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 44. But under Delaware law, the directors of a public benefit corporation have significant leeway in balancing shareholder financial interests with the best interests of those materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, and the specific public benefit identified in the Certificate of Incorporation—in this case funding AI research to benefit the public. As long as their decisions are informed, disinterested and “not such that no person of ordinary, sound judgment would approve,” directors will steer clear of liability.102Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 365, (<)em(>)see also(<)/em(>) David Nows & Jeff Thomas, (<)em(>)Delaware’s Public Benefit Corporation: The Traditional VC-Backed Company’s Mission Driven Twin(<)/em(>) (unpublished manuscript) (Sep. 3, 2019), (<)a href='https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3447351'(>)https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3447351(<)/a(>); (<)em(>)Developments in the Law(<)/em(>), Harv. L. Rev., (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 10, at 1644; (<)em(>)see also(<)/em(>) (<)em(>)The Delaware Way: Deference to the Business Judgment of Directors Who Act Loyally and Carefully(<)/em(>), Del. Corp. L., (<)a href='https://corplaw.delaware.gov/delaware-way-business-judgment/'(>)https://corplaw.delaware.gov/delaware-way-business-judgment/(<)/a(>) (last visited July 7, 2025) (describing the business judgment rule, which shields directors from liability so long as they act in good faith, with due care, and without conflicts of interests). Under the business judgment rule, courts will not second-guess a board’s balancing decision as long as it has a rational basis. Because the PBC legal regime is fairly new and hard to challenge, there is relatively little guidance as to how directors should balance profit, mission and stakeholder interests. Furthermore, only directors and certain shareholders can challenge company decisions. The section below, “Limited Director Liability for Prioritizing Profit Over Mission,” explains in greater detail the potential and limitations of the PBC regime for prioritizing profits over the mission. In sum, the absolute primacy of the mission hardcoded in the original non-profit and in the previous joint venture agreements103(<)em(>)See(<)/em(>) (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) notes 65–70 and accompanying text on the partnership agreement of OpenAI LP and the operating agreement of OpenAI Global LLC.  is now just one among several factors driving OpenAI, and enforcement avenues remain limited.104(<)em(>)Update: Not For Private Gain(<)/em(>), (<)em(>)supra(<)/em(>) note 88 (denouncing the dilution of the non-profit mission in the new structure).

Changes in corporate structure reflect OpenAI’s evolution from a non-profit research lab to a product-driven venture. Having streamlined its uniquely complex web of interlocking legal entities into a single public benefit corporation, today it stands at the crossroads.